How to Stop Lateral Movement in Black Basta, Akira, and LockBit Ransomware Attacks

The Critical Phase Attackers Need to Succeed

Ransomware operators from Black Basta, Akira, and LockBit share a common dependency: they all rely on lateral movement to transform a single compromised endpoint into an enterprise-wide catastrophe. This pivoting phase—where attackers traverse internal networks after gaining initial access—represents the difference between a contained security incident and a complete operational shutdown affecting manufacturing production lines, healthcare patient care systems, or critical industrial infrastructure.

According to IBM's 2024 Cost of a Data Breach Report, the average cost of a data breach reached $4.88 million globally, with breaches involving stolen credentials taking 292 days to identify and contain. For organizations in the United States and Europe operating manufacturing facilities, healthcare networks, or industrial control systems, the operational disruption extends far beyond financial impact—production downtime, patient safety concerns, and regulatory penalties compound rapidly when attackers move freely through flat networks.

Security leaders at organizations with 3,000+ connected devices face a sobering reality: 70% of organizations experience significant business disruption from breaches, and attackers leveraging lateral movement now appear in over 70% of successful ransomware campaigns. Breaking the lateral movement kill chain before attackers reach domain controllers, backup infrastructure, and virtualization management planes remains the most effective strategy for limiting blast radius and preserving business continuity.

What is Lateral Movement in Ransomware Attacks?

Lateral movement describes the techniques attackers use to pivot through internal networks after establishing an initial foothold. Rather than attacking from outside the perimeter, threat actors operating Black Basta, Akira, or LockBit campaigns leverage compromised credentials, trusted administrative protocols, and legitimate enterprise tools to move east-west across network segments. This approach exploits the implicit trust that traditional network architectures grant to internal traffic, allowing attackers to access file servers, domain controllers, backup systems, and hypervisor management planes without triggering perimeter defenses.

The protocols most frequently abused during lateral movement campaigns include Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for interactive sessions, Server Message Block (SMB) combined with administrative shares for file staging and remote execution, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for executing commands across multiple endpoints, and PsExec for rapid deployment of ransomware payloads. Security teams should also monitor for unauthorized remote access tools such as AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, and tunneling services like Ngrok or Cloudflare Tunnel, which attackers increasingly deploy to maintain persistent access while blending with legitimate IT activity.

Key Signs of Lateral Movement in Your Environment

Security operations teams should prioritize detection of anomalous authentication patterns where single accounts access dozens or hundreds of systems within compressed timeframes, new service creation events appearing simultaneously across multiple hosts, Group Policy Object modifications that deploy scripts or executables domain-wide, unexpected remote tool installations outside approved change windows, and tunneling indicators such as ngrok executables or unusual outbound connection patterns. Organizations operating in healthcare, manufacturing, or industrial sectors should pay particular attention to lateral movement attempts targeting operational technology networks, SCADA systems, and medical device management planes.

Black Basta Lateral Movement: Attack Patterns and Prevention

Black Basta operates as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) program with affiliates demonstrating sophisticated lateral movement capabilities across manufacturing, healthcare, and critical infrastructure targets. U.S. government reporting from CISA and IC3 documents Black Basta affiliates leveraging credential-driven pivots combined with RDP, PsExec, and remote tooling to achieve rapid spread across enterprise networks before deploying encryption payloads.

How Black Basta Moves Laterally

Black Basta campaigns typically begin with initial access through phishing, malware loaders, purchased access from initial access brokers, or exploitation of edge devices including VPN gateways. Affiliates have demonstrated particular interest in Ivanti Connect Secure vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887), which provide authentication bypass and command injection capabilities that translate directly into valid internal credentials. Once inside the network, attackers harvest credentials using techniques mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1003 (OS Credential Dumping), then leverage those credentials to pivot through RDP sessions, SMB administrative shares, and WMI execution jobs.

Security researchers have documented Black Basta affiliates deploying Cobalt Strike beacons, ScreenConnect, and Splashtop remote access tools to maintain persistence and facilitate lateral movement. The combination of legitimate remote access tools with encrypted command-and-control channels allows attackers to blend with normal IT administration traffic while positioning payloads across critical systems. Pre-encryption activities typically include disabling endpoint detection tools, inhibiting system recovery capabilities, and staging ransomware on domain controllers for maximum deployment reach.

How to Prevent Black Basta Lateral Movement

Organizations can disrupt Black Basta lateral movement by implementing identity-based microsegmentation that enforces least privilege access policies regardless of network location. Priority controls include deploying phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication on all external authentication points, patching Ivanti and other edge devices immediately upon vulnerability disclosure, restricting administrative protocols (RDP, SMB, WMI) to designated jump hosts and management networks, implementing privileged access management with just-in-time credential provisioning, and establishing network segmentation that isolates domain controllers, backup infrastructure, and virtualization management from general user networks.

For healthcare organizations subject to HIPAA requirements, network segmentation controls directly support compliance obligations while reducing the blast radius of potential Black Basta intrusions. Manufacturing enterprises should ensure production networks maintain appropriate separation from IT infrastructure, with monitoring capabilities that detect anomalous east-west traffic patterns before attackers reach operational technology systems.

Akira Ransomware Lateral Movement: Techniques and Countermeasures

Akira ransomware has demonstrated rapid evolution since its emergence, with CISA issuing updated advisories documenting increasingly sophisticated lateral movement capabilities. Security researchers tracking Akira campaigns report particular focus on organizations operating VPN appliances, firewall platforms, and backup infrastructure—attack surface areas that provide broad network reach once compromised. The cross-platform nature of Akira variants, targeting both Windows and Linux/ESXi environments, demands comprehensive segmentation coverage spanning traditional enterprise IT and virtualization infrastructure.

How Akira Ransomware Moves Laterally

Akira operators demonstrate heavy reliance on compromised VPN credentials and edge device vulnerabilities for initial access, with documented exploitation of SonicWall SonicOS improper access control (CVE-2024-40766) and Veeam Backup & Replication credential disclosure (CVE-2023-27532). Once authenticated to the network, attackers move laterally using a combination of legitimate remote access tools including AnyDesk, MobaXterm, and RustDesk, alongside standard administrative protocols. The establishment of tunneling services through Ngrok and Cloudflare Tunnel provides attackers with encrypted command-and-control channels while enabling persistent reach-back capabilities.

Unlike some ransomware families that focus exclusively on Windows environments, Akira campaigns frequently target Linux servers and VMware ESXi hypervisors during lateral movement phases. This dual-platform approach enables attackers to encrypt virtualized infrastructure at the hypervisor level, maximizing operational impact by affecting multiple virtual machines simultaneously. Organizations operating hybrid environments should ensure segmentation policies extend consistently across both Windows and Linux infrastructure, with particular attention to isolating hypervisor management interfaces from general network traffic.

How to Prevent Akira Lateral Movement

Stopping Akira lateral movement requires securing the attack surface areas that provide initial access while implementing controls that limit east-west pivot capabilities. Security teams should prioritize patching SonicWall and Veeam platforms against documented vulnerabilities, treating backup infrastructure as Tier-0 assets requiring equivalent protection to domain controllers. VPN credential rotation following any suspected compromise prevents attackers from maintaining persistent access, while network segmentation ensures that even successful VPN authentication does not grant unrestricted internal network access.

Detection capabilities should focus on identifying unauthorized remote tool installations, tunneling service executions, and anomalous SSH/RDP authentication patterns. For manufacturing organizations operating across multiple facilities, centralized visibility into cross-site lateral movement attempts enables rapid containment before attackers propagate between locations. Healthcare enterprises should implement segmentation policies that protect medical device networks and clinical systems from lateral movement originating in compromised administrative or guest network segments.

LockBit Lateral Movement Techniques: Enterprise-Scale Prevention

LockBit operates as one of the most prolific ransomware-as-a-service ecosystems, with LockBit 5.0 variants demonstrating continued focus on rapid enterprise-scale propagation. The affiliate-driven model means lateral movement tradecraft varies across campaigns, but common patterns emerge around leveraging valid credentials combined with PsExec-style remote service execution, WMI jobs, and Group Policy Object abuse for domain-wide payload deployment. Security teams defending against LockBit lateral movement techniques must address both the credential theft that enables pivoting and the administrative protocols that facilitate spread.

How LockBit Moves Laterally

LockBit affiliates demonstrate efficient lateral movement patterns optimized for maximum deployment speed. After establishing initial access through phishing, exploit activity, or purchased credentials, attackers harvest additional credentials and pivot through RDP sessions to establish interactive control over key systems. Remote service creation and execution—techniques associated with PsExec and mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1569.002—enable rapid deployment of ransomware across multiple endpoints without requiring individual interactive access to each target.

The use of Group Policy Object modifications to push payloads domain-wide represents a particularly efficient lateral movement technique, as attackers leverage existing enterprise infrastructure to distribute ransomware automatically to all domain-joined systems. This approach bypasses the need for individual system compromise by exploiting the trust relationship between domain controllers and member systems. Organizations with flat network architectures where any authenticated user can reach domain controllers face elevated risk from GPO-based deployment techniques.

How to Stop LockBit Lateral Movement in Your Network

Defending against LockBit lateral movement techniques requires breaking the attack chain at multiple points. Identity controls including privileged access management with just-in-time credential provisioning prevent attackers from obtaining the administrative credentials needed for PsExec and WMI-based lateral movement. Network segmentation that restricts access to domain controllers from general user networks limits the reach of GPO-based deployment techniques, while protocol controls that disable unnecessary WMI/WinRM services on endpoints reduce the attack surface available for remote execution.

Security operations teams should implement detections for new service creation events across multiple hosts, GPO changes that deploy scripts or binaries, and abnormal authentication patterns where single accounts authenticate to dozens of systems within short timeframes. Manufacturing organizations with distributed production facilities should ensure that compromise at one location cannot propagate to others through shared administrative infrastructure or flat network connectivity between sites.

Breaking the Lateral Movement Kill Chain Across All Three Families

Black Basta, Akira, and LockBit campaigns share a recognizable lateral movement pattern that security teams can disrupt at multiple stages. The common kill chain progresses from initial access through edge devices, phishing, or valid credentials, to credential acquisition via dumping or token theft, followed by internal discovery of domain structure, file shares, backup systems, and hypervisors. Lateral movement then enables attackers to reach Tier-0 assets including Active Directory, vCenter management, and backup infrastructure, positioning for data exfiltration and ransomware deployment.

The most effective defensive strategy focuses on breaking the chain at stages two through four—credential acquisition, discovery, and lateral movement. Identity-based microsegmentation enforces least privilege access policies that prevent compromised credentials from granting unrestricted network access, while protocol controls limit the administrative pathways available for lateral pivoting. Detection capabilities that identify credential harvesting attempts, anomalous discovery activity, and suspicious authentication patterns enable security teams to initiate containment before attackers reach critical infrastructure.

Understanding the Seven-Stage Attack Progression

Mapping the complete attack progression helps security teams prioritize defensive investments. Stage one involves initial access through VPN compromise, phishing payloads, or exploitation of internet-facing applications—the entry point that gives attackers their first foothold. Stage two focuses on credential acquisition, where attackers dump credentials from memory, steal tokens, or exploit password reuse to obtain the authentication material needed for lateral movement. Stage three encompasses internal discovery, during which attackers enumerate Active Directory structure, identify file shares, locate backup systems, and map paths to high-value targets.

Stage four represents the lateral movement phase itself, where attackers pivot through RDP sessions, SMB connections, WMI jobs, and PsExec-style remote execution to reach additional systems. Stage five involves achieving control over Tier-0 assets—domain controllers that enable domain-wide policy changes, vCenter platforms managing virtualized infrastructure, and backup systems that attackers disable before encryption. Stage six encompasses data exfiltration for double extortion purposes, where attackers copy sensitive files to cloud storage or attacker-controlled infrastructure. Stage seven completes the attack with ransomware deployment and encryption across compromised systems.

Breaking the chain at any stage disrupts the overall attack, but stages two through four offer the highest-leverage defensive opportunities. Controls implemented at these stages prevent attackers from obtaining the credentials needed for pivoting, limit the network pathways available for lateral movement, and contain compromised systems before they enable access to critical infrastructure.

Consolidated Defense Controls for Lateral Movement Prevention

Effective lateral movement defense requires coordinated implementation across people, process, and technology domains. Security leaders should establish asset inventory programs covering VPN appliances, identity infrastructure, virtualization platforms, backup systems, IoT/OT, IoMT devices, and remote management tools—mapping owners, patch SLAs, and monitoring coverage for each system. Policy frameworks should define explicit segmentation requirements isolating management networks, backup infrastructure, and operational technology from general user access, while process controls ensure credential rotation following suspected compromise and restrict administrative protocol usage to designated pathways.

Technology controls enabling lateral movement prevention include:

• Identity hardening: Phishing-resistant MFA on all external authentication, privileged access management with just-in-time provisioning, and continuous verification of user and device identity before granting access
• Network segmentation: Identity-based microsegmentation isolating domain controllers, backup platforms, hypervisor management, OT networks from general traffic, with policy enforcement extending across managed and unmanaged devices
• Protocol restrictions: Limiting RDP, SMB admin shares, WMI, and remote service creation to designated administrative pathways, removing local admin privileges where possible, and blocking unauthorized remote access tool installations
• Detection and response: Monitoring for credential harvesting, service creation across multiple hosts, GPO modifications, tunneling activity, and anomalous authentication patterns, with automated isolation capabilities for rapid containment

Implementation Roadmap: 90-Day Lateral Movement Defense Program

Effective lateral movement prevention requires coordinated action across people, process, compliance, and technology domains. Security leaders who approach this challenge holistically—rather than treating it as purely a technology deployment—achieve faster implementation timelines and more sustainable security improvements. The following 90-day roadmap provides a structured approach for organizations with 3,000+ devices requiring protection.

People and Organizational Considerations

Before initiating technical implementation, security leaders should establish cross-functional governance structures that bring together network operations, endpoint security, identity management, and business application teams. Lateral movement prevention touches each of these domains, and successful implementation requires coordinated policy development and change management. Organizations should designate executive sponsors who can resolve cross-team conflicts and maintain project momentum, along with technical leads from each functional area who can translate security requirements into operational procedures.

Training and awareness programs should educate IT staff about lateral movement attack patterns, helping administrators recognize the difference between legitimate administrative activity and attacker behavior. Security operations teams require specific training on detection playbooks for Black Basta, Akira, and LockBit lateral movement techniques, including the credential harvesting, remote tool deployment, and GPO modification patterns documented earlier in this guide.

Days 1-30: Visibility and Assessment

Security leaders should begin by establishing comprehensive asset inventory covering VPN and firewall appliances, identity infrastructure including Active Directory and SSO platforms, virtualization management systems, backup platforms, IoT, OT, IoMT devices, and remote access tooling currently deployed in the environment. This visibility phase supports risk assessment by identifying which systems represent high-value lateral movement targets and which network pathways enable east-west traffic between security zones. Organizations should map current segmentation coverage and identify gaps where lateral movement could proceed unchallenged between IT and OT networks, between user segments and administrative infrastructure, or between production environments and backup systems.

Assessment activities should also document current compliance posture against relevant frameworks. Healthcare organizations should evaluate alignment with HIPAA Security Rule requirements for access controls and network segmentation. Manufacturing enterprises should assess compliance with IEC 62443 standards for industrial control system security. Organizations pursuing Zero Trust maturity should benchmark current capabilities against CISA's Zero Trust Maturity Model across identity, devices, networks, applications, and data pillars.

Days 31-60: Access Controls and Policy Development

The second phase focuses on implementing identity-based access controls and developing microsegmentation policies. Priority activities include deploying phishing-resistant MFA on all external authentication points, implementing privileged access management for administrative credentials, establishing network segmentation policies that isolate Tier-0 assets from general network access, and configuring protocol restrictions that limit RDP, SMB, and WMI traffic to approved administrative pathways. Organizations should leverage policy simulation capabilities to validate that new controls do not disrupt legitimate business workflows before moving to enforcement.

Process development during this phase should establish credential rotation procedures for use following suspected compromise, incident response playbooks specific to lateral movement containment, and change control processes for segmentation policy modifications. Documentation requirements should support both operational execution and compliance demonstration, with audit trails capturing policy decisions and their rationale.

Days 61-90: Detection, Testing, and Continuous Improvement

The final implementation phase deploys detection capabilities mapped to Black Basta, Akira, and LockBit lateral movement techniques while establishing testing programs that validate defensive controls. Security teams should configure alerts for credential harvesting indicators, service creation events across multiple hosts, GPO modifications deploying executables, unauthorized remote tool installations, and tunneling service activity. Tabletop exercises should simulate lateral movement scenarios specific to each ransomware family, testing incident response procedures and validating that segmentation policies contain simulated attacks to expected boundaries.

Continuous improvement processes should incorporate lessons learned from exercises, threat intelligence updates about evolving lateral movement techniques, and periodic assessments validating that segmentation policies remain aligned with business requirements. Organizations should establish regular review cycles—quarterly for policy effectiveness and annually for comprehensive posture assessment—ensuring lateral movement defenses evolve alongside the threat landscape.

Compliance Alignment and Reporting

Lateral movement prevention controls support compliance obligations across multiple frameworks simultaneously. NIST 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture guidance emphasizes continuous verification and least privilege access—principles directly supported by identity-based microsegmentation. CISA's Zero Trust Maturity Model provides specific maturity targets for network segmentation capabilities, enabling organizations to demonstrate progress toward Zero Trust implementation. Healthcare organizations can document HIPAA Security Rule compliance through segmentation policies protecting electronic protected health information. Manufacturing enterprises can align segmentation implementations with IEC 62443 zone and conduit concepts for industrial control system security.

Reporting capabilities should support both internal governance and external audit requirements. Dashboards providing visibility into policy coverage, enforcement status, and violation alerts enable security operations teams to monitor lateral movement defense effectiveness. Audit reports documenting policy configurations, access decisions, and change history demonstrate compliance to regulators and cyber insurers—many of whom now require specific microsegmentation controls as a condition of coverage.

Modern Microsegmentation: Stopping Lateral Movement Without Complexity

Traditional segmentation approaches relying on complex VLAN architectures, firewall rules, and endpoint agents often stall during implementation, leaving organizations exposed to lateral movement attacks. Legacy microsegmentation projects require extensive planning, specialized expertise, and coordination across network, endpoint, and security teams that extends timelines to years rather than months. Modern identity-based microsegmentation platforms address these challenges by leveraging existing network infrastructure to enforce granular access policies without requiring new hardware, agents, or complex reconfigurations.

Organizations implementing identity-based microsegmentation can achieve rapid deployment measured in weeks rather than years, with policy enforcement extending consistently across IT, IoT, OT, and IoMT device populations. This approach addresses the expanded attack surface created by connected manufacturing systems, medical devices, and industrial controllers that cannot run endpoint agents but still require protection from lateral movement attacks. Dynamic policies that automatically adjust based on device identity, user context, and risk scores ensure that security controls remain current as the environment evolves.

Healthcare organizations report 76% reduction in total cost of ownership compared to legacy segmentation architectures, while achieving 95% faster implementation times and 90% reduction in potential breach blast radius. Manufacturing enterprises benefit from microsegmentation's ability to isolate critical production systems, with industry research indicating $2 million to $3 million in annual savings through avoided production downtime. These outcomes align with regulatory requirements including NIST 800-207 Zero Trust guidance, CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model recommendations, HIPAA Security Rule mandates, and IEC 62443 standards for industrial control system security.

Industry-Specific Lateral Movement Defense Considerations

Healthcare organizations face unique lateral movement defense challenges stemming from the proliferation of connected medical devices, clinical workflow dependencies, and stringent patient safety requirements. Medical devices running legacy operating systems or proprietary firmware cannot deploy endpoint agents, yet these devices often connect to sensitive clinical systems and patient data repositories. Identity-based microsegmentation addresses this gap by enforcing access policies at the network level, protecting medical devices without requiring software installation that could affect device certification or clinical functionality.

The proposed 2025 HIPAA Security Rule updates elevate network segmentation from an addressable specification to a mandatory requirement, increasing regulatory pressure on healthcare organizations to implement effective lateral movement prevention controls. Organizations that proactively deploy microsegmentation not only improve security posture but also position themselves for compliance with evolving regulatory requirements while potentially reducing cyber insurance premiums—carriers increasingly require demonstrated segmentation capabilities before offering coverage.

Manufacturing and industrial enterprises confront lateral movement risks spanning both IT infrastructure and operational technology environments. Production systems including PLCs, SCADA controllers, and industrial automation equipment require network connectivity for operations yet represent critical targets for ransomware attacks seeking maximum business disruption. Lateral movement from compromised IT systems into OT networks has enabled attackers to disrupt manufacturing operations, damage equipment, and endanger worker safety.

Effective lateral movement defense for manufacturing organizations requires segmentation policies that isolate production networks from administrative infrastructure while preserving the controlled connectivity necessary for production operations. Solutions must support the diverse protocols and device types common in OT environments, including legacy systems that cannot be updated or replaced without significant operational investment. Identity-based microsegmentation platforms that leverage existing network infrastructure provide the visibility and control necessary for OT security without introducing additional complexity or points of failure into production environments.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is lateral movement in ransomware attacks like Black Basta, Akira, and LockBit?

Lateral movement describes the techniques ransomware operators use to traverse internal networks after gaining initial access. Black Basta, Akira, and LockBit campaigns leverage compromised credentials, trusted administrative protocols like RDP, SMB, and WMI, and legitimate remote access tools to pivot from the initial foothold to critical systems including domain controllers, backup infrastructure, and virtualization management platforms. Breaking the lateral movement chain prevents attackers from transforming a single compromised endpoint into an enterprise-wide ransomware deployment affecting thousands of systems.

How can I detect Black Basta lateral movement in my network?

Security teams should monitor for credential harvesting attempts, anomalous RDP and SMB traffic patterns, new service creation events appearing simultaneously across multiple hosts, and unauthorized installation of remote access tools such as ScreenConnect, Splashtop, or Cobalt Strike beacons. Black Basta affiliates frequently establish encrypted command-and-control channels through HTTPS, so detection capabilities should extend to identifying unusual TLS fingerprints and proxy tunneling behavior. Behavioral analytics that baseline normal administrative activity patterns help identify Black Basta lateral movement attempts that otherwise blend with legitimate IT operations.

How do I prevent Akira lateral movement in hybrid or multi-cloud environments?

Preventing Akira lateral movement across hybrid environments requires consistent segmentation policies spanning on-premises infrastructure, cloud workloads, and the network pathways connecting them. Organizations should patch VPN and firewall platforms against documented vulnerabilities including CVE-2024-40766 for SonicWall and CVE-2023-27532 for Veeam, implement identity-based access controls that prevent compromised credentials from granting unrestricted network access, and monitor for tunneling service activity including Ngrok and Cloudflare Tunnel that Akira operators use for persistent reach-back capabilities. Hypervisor management interfaces require particular protection given Akira's demonstrated targeting of VMware ESXi environments.

What best practices stop LockBit lateral movement for large enterprises?

Large enterprises defending against LockBit lateral movement should implement privileged access management with just-in-time credential provisioning, network segmentation that restricts access to domain controllers from general user networks, protocol controls limiting PsExec, WMI, and WinRM to designated administrative pathways, and monitoring for Group Policy Object modifications that deploy scripts or executables domain-wide. Organizations operating multiple facilities should ensure that administrative infrastructure isolation prevents lateral movement between sites. Regular tabletop exercises simulating LockBit deployment scenarios validate that containment procedures effectively limit blast radius.

Are Black Basta, Akira, and LockBit lateral movement techniques different across regions?

The core lateral movement techniques employed by Black Basta, Akira, and LockBit remain consistent across geographic regions—attackers leverage the same credential theft, administrative protocol abuse, and remote tool deployment regardless of whether targets operate in the United States, European Union, or Asia-Pacific. However, regulatory requirements and sector-specific targeting priorities vary by region. Organizations in the EU should consider NIS2 directive requirements for network security controls, while U.S. healthcare organizations must align lateral movement prevention strategies with HIPAA Security Rule mandates. Manufacturing enterprises across all regions should implement segmentation consistent with IEC 62443 industrial control system security standards.

Taking Action: Secure Your Network Against Lateral Movement Attacks

Stopping lateral movement represents the highest-leverage defensive investment for organizations facing ransomware threats from Black Basta, Akira, LockBit, and similar campaigns. By breaking the attack chain before adversaries reach domain controllers, backup infrastructure, and virtualization management systems, security teams limit blast radius from potential intrusions while preserving operational continuity across manufacturing production, healthcare delivery, and industrial operations.

Modern microsegmentation platforms enable organizations to implement identity-based access controls across their entire device population—including IT endpoints, IoT systems, operational technology, and medical devices—within weeks rather than the years required by legacy segmentation approaches. This accelerated path to Zero Trust maturity supports both security improvement and compliance objectives while reducing the total cost of ownership compared to traditional architectures built on complex VLANs, firewall rules, and endpoint agents.

Security leaders ready to assess their lateral movement exposure and develop prevention strategies should engage with qualified microsegmentation solution providers for a discussion covering current security posture, regulatory compliance requirements, and implementation roadmap development. Organizations can also request targeted demonstrations showing how identity-based microsegmentation addresses specific Black Basta, Akira, and LockBit lateral movement techniques documented in this guide.

Ready to stop lateral movement in your environment? Schedule a consultation with Elisity to learn how identity-based microsegmentation can protect your manufacturing facilities, healthcare networks, or industrial infrastructure from Black Basta, Akira, LockBit, and emerging ransomware threats.